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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
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HUGH P. ¥OMZELL RUHSAM, JR.,
Respondent,
Case No. 20727

v.
JANET ELIZABETH RUHSAM,
Appellant.
000O000

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

IDENTITY OF PARTIES
The only interested parties are named in the caption
ISSUES PRESENTED
1.

Is there any evidence to support the trial court's

Finding that the health of the Respondent Husband is "precarious"
and that he has "heart problems"?
2.

In view of the Appellant Wife's ill health and

minimal earning capacity compared with the Respondent Husband's
demonstrated substantial earning capability, is the trial court's
alimony award of $600 per month adequate?

3.

Did the trial court abuse its discretion by

arbitrarily ordering the parties to divide their personal
property by sequentially selecting items from a list without any
review by the Court or consideration of the nature and types of
assets involved?
4.

Did the trial court abuse its discretion in

ordering that the right to "control the sale" and the occupancy
of the parties1 primary residence shift back and forth between
the parties every six months until it was sold?
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is a divorce action involving a fourteen-year
marriage.

There were no children born during the marriage so

there is no issue as to custooy.

A one-day hearing was held

before the Honorable John F. Wahlquist on January 3, 1985, after
which the court entered a Memorandum Decision (R. at 95-102 infra
at A-2 through A-9), Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (R.
at 104-14, infra at A-10 through A-20), and a Decree of Divorce
(R. at 115-20 infra at A-21 through A-26).

Thereafter, a Motion

to Alter or Amend (R. at 121-24) and a Supplemental Motion to
Alter or Amend (R. at 127-30) were filed by Appellant Janet
Ruhsam.

These Motions were heard by the trial court on May 13,

1985, and an Order was entered on May 16, 1985, (R. at 143-44)

making minor technical changes

-

iginal Fit:iciings and

Decree but otherwise denying the motion.

Amended Findings of

Fact and Conclusions of Law (R. at 145-54 infra at A-27 through
A-36) anI an Amended Decree of Divorce

• I" :-50 infra at

A-37 through A-42) were signed and entered by the trial court.
This appeal is from the alimony and property distribution
provisions of the Amended Decree.

S1 r/i, i EMEN i oi1 F \c rs
The parties were married on December 18, 1970, and no
children were born as issue of this marriage.

Defendant-

Appellant Janet Elizabeth Ruhsam (hereinafter "Mrs. Ruhsam") is
forty-nine years of age (R. at 248) and a high school graduate
R. at 249). Prior to her marriage, she was employed as a
beautician (R. at 224); however, upon her marriage to PlaintiffRespondent Hugh :\ Vonzell Ruhsam, Jr. (hereinafter "Mr. Ruhsam"),
he insisted that she give up her work (R. at 249), it
being the intention of the parties that she would be an "Air Force
wife" and follow her husband around as his duty was transferred
(R. at 243, 250). During the marriage, Mrs. Ruhsam had no real
employment other than as a saleslady for A v oi: i Prodi icts (R. a t
243),

from which endeavor she earned only $1,600 in 1984 (R. at

255) and never earned more than $4,000 per year (Id.).
3

Unfortunately, Mrs. RuhsanTs health has been extremely
poor.

In 1977, she was diagnosed as having cancer of the left

breast and underwent a radical mastectomy in Texas.

(R. at 189.)

In 1984, she was diagnosed as having cancer of the right breast
(R. at 254), and underwent a modified radical mastectomy of the
right breast (R. at 189). According to the testimony of her
physician, Dr. Lyle Archibald, in addition to enduring the
considerable pain and emotional stress inherent in such surgery,
Mrs. Ruhsam is at risk for a further recurrence of the cancer
that has already necessitated two major surgeries in the past
seven years.

(R. at 189.)

Dr. Archibald also testified that

Mrs. Ruhsam must have frequent and expensive check-ups to monitor
her condition (R. at 189) and is a candidate for reconstructive
surgery (R. at 193). Because of her prior problems, Mrs. Ruhsam
is unable to procure any health insurance (R. at 275).
While her doctor feels that Mrs. Ruhsam could
physically handle some light, sedentary activities (R. at 197),
r.he continues to suffer pain from her surgeries, sinus headaches,
migraine headaches, and "shooting pain" up and down her right
arm.

(R. at 256.)

Mrs. Pubsamfs lower jaw is decaying seriously

(R. at 256) and she has been advised that she will have to incur
substantial expenses in the treatment of that condition (R. at

4

284).

Additionally, she has an arthritic condition in both hands

(R. at 256) and bursitis in her left knee (R. at 257).
Obvious!

>;

f

.-.,.-

s realistic expectations of income from

future employment must be severely limited.
Mr. Ruhsam, on the other hand, is fifty-six years of
age (R. at 226) and in generally very good health.

Although the

trial court found (Memorandum Decision, R. at 97-98 infra at A-4
through A-5 and Findings .VI0, R. at 149-50 infra at A-31 through
A-32) that

leart problems, " Mr. Riitisam's test imony--the

only evidence on the point--was that he had "no heart problem"
(R. at 219), Mi , Ruhsam retired from the Air Force as a full
colonel (R. at 216) and receives $2,941 per month in retirement
and disability pay (R. at 239). He is also employed by Jetway
(R. at 209), the company that manufactures the walkways that lead
from airport passenger gates to the aircraft.

He holds the

position of marketing manager and is responsible for sales
throughout Europe and the Middle East

(R. at 225.)

At the time

of trial, he was earning j2,915 per month exclusive of fringe
benefits (R. at 219), bringing his total monthly income to more
than $5,850.
While 5 11
Mrs. Ruhsam is not

D

'*"hi 3 a i n is eligible *

** rtgage financing,

at 232); moreover, Mrs. Ruhsam could not

purchase a home through conventional mortgage financing because
5

of her lack of income (R. at 274). The trial court ordered that
the parties' principal residence and a second, smaller home in
Roy, Utah, both be sold and the proceeds divided equally between
the parties.

Although the trial court made no findings as to the

value of either of these major assets, the evidence is that the
principal residence has a market value of approximately $98,000
(R. at 178) and a mortgage encumbrance of approximately $41,400
(R. at 206), leaving a net equity of approximately $53,600, while
the smaller home in Roy, Utah, has a market value of not more
than $55,000 (R. at 181) and a mortgage encumbrance of $39,700
(Exhibit 8-D) leaving a net equity of $15,000 or less.

Thus,

after realtors1 commissions and costs of sale have been paid,
Mrs. Ruhsam will receive considerably less than $30,000 for her
share of these homes,
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
There is simply no evidence to support the trial
court's Finding that Mr. Ruhsam is in "precarious health" and has
"heart problems."

His own testimony was to the contrary and,

when compared with the chronic and severe ill health
unfortunately experienced bv Mrs. Ruhsam, his health can onlv be
considered excellent.

Similarly, the trial court's Finding that

Mr. Ruhsam's income is between $2,000 and $3,000 per month fails
6

to adequately recognize that, in fact, he is earning at least
$2,915 per month from his employment and receiving an additional
$2,941 per month from his military retirement pay.

On the other

hand, Mrs. Ruhsam earned onlv $1,600 in all of 1984, is in ill
health, and has not worked, in effect, in the fourteen years of
her marriage.

The trial court's Findings with resoect to Mr.

Ruhsam's health are contrary to the evidence and the trial
court's award of $600 per month in alimony is totally inadequate
based upon the needs of Mrs. Ruhsam and the demonstrated income
potential of Mr. Ruhsam.
The property distribution ordered by the trial court is
in abuse of discretion.

The trial court failed to place values

on the parties1 two homes, their most substantial assets.
Instead, the trial court ordered that both be sold.

The sale of

both of these assets will result in less than $30,000 to Mrs.
Ruhsam, who is ineligible for VA mortgage financing and cannot
qualify for conventional mortgage financing because of her very
limited income.

Thus, she is deprived of any means to acquire

housing, other than to rent, which will deplete her assets
further.

Moreover, the trial court ordered that the both

"control of the sale'1 and the occupancy of the principal
residence vacillate back and forth every six months.

7

The moving

expenses and logistical problems created by such an arrangement
are unworkable and will further exhaust and deplete Mrs. Ruhsamfs
very limited assets.
Also an abuse of discretion is the trial court's ruling
that the parties alternately select items of personal proprety
from a list.

While it was convenient for the trial court since

it obviated any need to actually consider the distribution of
these assets, it wholly fails to fulfill the trial court's most
important function in a domestic relations case:

the equitable

distribution of the parties' assets so as to maximize the
parties' financial resources.

Since the trial court has failed

to give any consideration whatsoever to the nature of the items,
to which party has most need for the items, or to how the items
can most effectively be divided, the trial court has utterly
failed to fulfill its most important function.

The procedure

fashioned by the trial court is entirely arbitrary and it is a
gross abuse of the trial court's discretion.

It is truly as

fallacious as King Solomon's Biblical custody determination.

8

ARGUMENT
POINT I.

THE EVIDENCE FAILS TO SUPPORT, INDEED IT

REFUTES, THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS AS TO MR. RUHSAM'S HEALTH.
Both the Memorandum Decision (R. at 95-102, infra at
A-2 through A-9) and the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
(as amended) (R. at 145-54, infra at A-27 through A-36)
appropriately emphasize that the

fT

physical health and earning

capacity of each of the parties is important" to the
determination of alimony.

Having correctly noted the importance

of the health and earning capacity of the parties, the trial
court then erroneously found that Mr. Ruhsamfs health was
"precarious" and that he had a "heart condition and other health
problems."

In fact, Mr. Ruhsam's only health problem of which

there is any evidence in ^his case is that he has "a mild case of
hypertension."

(R. at 218.)

Despite a leading auestion

suggesting that he had "heart problems," Mr. Ruhsam testified
that he did not:
Mr. Vlahos: Hugh, would you tell the Court, if
you would please, what is the—what is
the status of your health at this point?
Answer:
Well, I have a mild case of
hypertension. And other than that it's
fairly good, I assume. I'm due for a
physical tomorrow and I can find out more.
Question: Do you have high blood pressure?
Answer:
Yes, I do.
Question: Are you being treated for that?
Answer:
Yes, I take medication.
9

Question: And are you also having some heart
orob]em9
Answer:
Other than the high blood pressure, no
heart problems.
R. at 218-19.

Simply stated, this evidence, the only evidence

relating to Mr. RuhsanTs health, fails to support the trial
court's finding that his health is "precarious" and that he has
"heart problems."

The trial court's findings in these critical

areas are totally without support in the evidence adduced at the
trial.
Similarly misleading is the trial courtTs finding that
Mr. Ruhsam's earning capacity "is somewhere between $2,000 and
$3,000 per month."

(Memorandum Decision, R. at 98, infra at A-5

and Findings 314, R. at 151, infra at A-33.)

In fact, Mr.

RuhsanTs earnings (without considering fringe benefits) from his
employment as the International Marketing Manager for Jetway is
$2,915 per month (R. at 219), and when his additional $2,941 per
month in retirement pay is considered (R. at 239), his income is
almost $6,000 per month.
In these important areas, the trial court's Findings
can only be characterized as erroneous and without evidentiary
support of any nature whatsoever.

10

POINT II,

THE ALIMONY AWARDED BY THE TRIAL COURT IS

NOT ADEQUATE.
In this case, the husband is in good health and earning
approximately $3,000 per month (exclusive of fringe benefits)
from his employment as the international marketing manager for
Jetway.

In addition, he receives almost another $3,000 per month

on account of his full colonel's retirement pay from the United
States Air Force.

In all, his monthly income is in excess of

$5,850 per month.

On the other hand, Mrs. Ruhsam was able to

earn only $1,600 during all of 1984.

She has not worked during

the fourteen years of this marriage other than as a saleslady for
Avon Products.

Additionally, she has had two major cancer

surgeries in the last seven years, resulting in two modified
radical mastectomies.

She has, naturally, had a great deal of

pain from these operations and continues to have "shooting pain'1
up and down her right arm.
migraine headaches.

She suffers from sinus headaches and

Her lower jaw is decaying, she has an

arthritic condition in both of her hands, and bursitis in her
left knee.

While her doctor feels that she may be able to handle

some "light, sedentary activity," it is apparent that her earning
capacity is severely limited.

In light of these circumstances,

the trial court's award of $600 per month in alimony, even when

11

coupled with her 15.55% share of Mr. Ruhsam's retirement pay, is
clearly inadequate.

This is particularly true in view of the

fact that she can reasonably anticipate heavy medical expenses in
the future and is unable to obtain medical insurance due to her
poor health.

Under the circumstances of this case, such a paltry

alimony award constitutes an abuse of the trial court's
discretion.
As this Court has frequently recognized, it is the
necessary function of alimony to provide support for the wife as
nearly as possible at the standard of living she enjoyed during
the marriage.

For example, this Court noted in

Fletcher v. Fletcher, 615 P.2d 1218 (Utah 1980), that:
The function of alimony is to provide supnort
for the wife as nearly as possible at the
standard of living she en.ioyed during the
marriage and to prevent the wife from becoming a
public charge. Criteria considered in
determining a reasonable award of support
include the financial condition and needs of the
wife, the ability of the wife to provide a
sufficient income for herself, and the ability
of her husband to provide support.
615 P.2d at 1223 (footnote citation omitted).

In this case, Mr.

Rubsam continues to enjoy his demonstrated ability to provide a
lucrative income.

On the other hand, Mrs. Ruhsam, who is now

fifty years of age, has not been employed to any significant
degree since prior to this marriage fourteen years ago.

12

These

factors militate strongly in favor of a substantial alimony
award.

Moreover, in view of the duration of the marriage, a very

substantial alimony award is not only appropriate but essential
to an equitable decree,

T>4s is particularly true in this case

since Mrs. Ruhsam gave up her earning capacity as part of her
commitment to the marriage and her willingness to fulfill the
role of 'an Air Force wife.1
Similarly, in Gramme v. Gramme, 587 P.2d 144 (Utah
1979), this Court observed that the function of alimony
is to provide support for the wife as nearly as
possible at the standard of living she enjoyed
during the marriage . . . . Important criteria
in determining a reasonable award for support
and maintenance are the financial condition and
needs of the wife, considering her station in
life; her ability to produce sufficient income
for herself; and the ability of her husband to
provide support.
587 P.2d 147 (footnote citation omitted).

Likewise, in Wilson

v. Wilson, 5 Utah 2d 79, 296 P.2d 977 (1958), this Court, faced
with a fifteen-year marriage, held that:
The Court's responsibility is to endeavor to
provide a just and equitable adjustment of [the
parties'] economic resources so that the parties
can reconstruct their lives on a happy and
useful basis. In doing so, it is necessary for
the Court to consider . . . an appraisal of all
of the attendant facts and circumstances; the
duration of the marriage; the ages of the
oarties; their social positions and standards of
living; their health; considerations relative to
children: the money and property they possess
13

and how it was acquired; their capabilities and
training and their present and potential
incomes.
296 P.2d at 979-80 (footnote citation omitted).

Each of these

factors demands a substantial alimony award for Mrs. Ruhsam in
view of the length of this marriage, her questionable
employability, the demonstrated earning potential of Mr, Ruhsam,
and the fact that, during this marriage, she was expected to
live, and has grown accustomed to, a life filled with social
activity, charitable works, and little remunerative employment.
It is not reasonable--and it is not consistent with the law of
this state—that this woman should now be compelled literallv to
fend for herself regardless of her ill health and her lack of
earning capacity.
In its very recent decision in Jones v. Jones, —
P.2d —

, 8 Utah Adv. Rep. 14 (Utah 1985), this Court reversed

as insufficient a $1,000 per month alimony award.

In that case,

this Court noted that nother than the assets awarded to her in
the property distribution, the wife has no assets and no outside
income."

-- P.2d at —

, 8 Utah Adv. Rep. at 16.

This

observation is equally true in the case now before this Court.
In Jones, this Court also noted:

14

The wife has no independent income. It is
entirely unrealistic to assume that a woman in
her mid-50's with no substantial work experience
or training will be able to enter the job market
and support herself in anything even resembling
the style to which the couple had been living.
—

P.2d at —

, 8 Utah Adv. Rep. at 16.

This Court then

went on to hold, in language equally applicable to the present
case, that
The foregoing analysis leads inexorably to
the conclusion that the trial court's alimony
award was inequitable . . . .
The wife is in
her mid-501s, possesses few marketable job
skills, and has little hope of retraining. This
is simply not the sort of situation in which a
decreasing rehabilitative alimony award is
appropriate. The husband operates a financially
succesful business, built up over twenty years
of marriage through the joint efforts of both
husband and wife. These facts clearly call for
some sort of continuing spousal maintenance.
The original award must be more substantial
[than the $1,000 per month awarded by the trial
court], considering the husband's real
discretionary income, and should continue at
that level for the foreseeable future.
-- P.2d at —

, 8 Utah Adv. Rep. at 17.

The $600 per month

awarded by the trial court in this case is even more
disproportionate than was the wife's award in Jones.

The $600

awarded by the trial court is inequitable and insufficient and
must be increased.

15

POINT III,

THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN

FASHIONING THE PROPERTY DISTRIBUTION IN THIS CASE.
A. The Trial Court Erred In Ordering That The Occupancy Of And
The Prerogative To Sell The Parties' Principal Residence Cycle
Back And Forth Between The Parties Every Six Months.
The Decree entered by the trial court in this action
provides that both the parties1 principal residence and their
Roy, Utah home be sold and the proceeds divided.
R. at 157, infra at A-39.)

(Decree at 16,

The Decree also provides, however,

that the occupancy of the principal residence, as well as the
prerogative to "have control over the sale" of that residence,
shall be vested in Mrs. Ruhsam for a period of six months and
then, if the sale has not been accomplished in that time, Mr.
Ruhsam shall have the occupancy and n the right to effect the sale
for the next six months.11
A-39 through A-40.)

(Decree at JT7, R. at 157-58, infra at

This aspect of the prooerty distribution

constitutes an abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court
for two reasons.
First, the vacillation of the occupancy and right to
sell the residence is absurd and serves no useful purpose.
Rather, it will cost the parties a great deal of money to move
their belongings in and out of the residence every six months

16

until it is sold.

Additionally, the concent of vesting in one

party the right to control the sale of the residence, without the
concurrence of the other or without any limitation upon the
discretion, can only serve as a constant source of unrest pnd
antagonism between these parties.

In short, there is no evidence

to support such a provision, it is economically unwise, and it is
an abuse of discretion.
Second, the order by the trial court that both of the
partiesT residences be sold is an abuse of discretion because it
fails to take into consideration the total inability of Mrs.
Ruhsam to qualify for mortgage financing to purchase alternate
housing for herself.

Her income during the last twelve months

was $1,600 and her income during the last two years combined was
$5,600.

She has chronic and serious health problems and no

substantial work experience in the last one and one-half decades.
She is not legally entitled to VA financing and she clearly does
not qualify for conventional financing since she has no
substantial source of income.

Yet the trial court has ordered

that both of the parties' residences be sold.

This decision

condemns Mrs. Ruhsam to renting her housing for the rest of
her life.

It is economically unwise, it is not necessitated by

the financial circumstances of the parties, and it is an abuse of
the trial court's discretion.
17

B.

The Trial Court's Totally Arbitrary Distribution Of The Parties'

Personal Property Constitutes A D Abuse Of Discretion.
Both parties proposed to the trial court distribution
schemes for thei- personal oroperty.

(Exhibits 6D & 7D and 13P.)

The trial court found both of these proposals to be
unsatisfactory and entirely rejected them.
J4 at R. at 98, infra at A-5.)

(Memorandum Decision

Rather than fashioning a workable

distribution of the parties' personal prooertv, the tria] court
arbitrarily elected to require the parties to sequentially select
items from a list of the persona] property.
158-59, infra at A-40 through A-41.)

(Decree JT12, R. at

The only precedential

support for such a procedure is found in the Bib]ical custody
determination of King Solomon and the trial court's decision in
this cas. is no more appropriate and is equally abusive of its
discretion.
The procedure utilized by the trial court utterly fails
to fulfill the most important purpose of the property
distribution:

to ensure that the parties1 resources are

maximized to the greatest extent possible.

The trial court has

utterly failed to make any attempt to place these parties in the
best possible position to continue with their lives.
be no .iustification for such a procedure.
discretion.
18

There can

It is a clear abuse of

POINT IV,

IN THIS EQUITABLE ACTION, THIS COURT MAY

REVIEW ALL ASPECTS OF THE TRIAL COURT'S RULINGS.
While due deference must be extended to the views of
the trial /judge who had a oersona.1 opportunity to observe the
witnesses, this Court is by no means bound by the express or
implicit Findings of Fact reached by the trial court.

This is a

domestic matter and, therefore, highly equitable in nature.

In

such an action, it is the duty of this Court to review and
consider questions both of fact and of law.

As noted in

Wiese v. Wiese, 24 Utah 2d 236, 469 P.2d 504 (1970):
This is an equitable matter, and upon appeal
the binding effect of the Findings made by the
trial court differs from that in a law matter.
We may here review questions of both law and
fact; and after making due allowance for the
advantaged position of the trial judge to
observe the demeanor of witnesses upon the
stand, we may be persuaded that a Finding is
against the preponderance of the evidence to
such an extent that we would be justified in
disapproving it or even making a Finding of our
own.
469 P.2d at 505 (numerous citations omitted).

In that case, this

Court rejected the trial court's determination and reversed the
trial court.

Likewise in the present case, this Court cannot let

the alimony and property distribution stand; they must be either
reversed or remanded.

19

CONCLUSION
The alimony and property distribution ordered by the
trial court in this action are unfair to Mrs. Ruhsam.

The trial

court, in granting only $600 per month in alimony, bases its
decision upon the perception that Mr. Ruhsam is in "precarious
health" and has heart problems.

In fact, there is no evidence to

support either Finding and the evidence overwhelmingly
demonstrates that Mr. RuhsamTs health is far superior to that of
Mrs. Ruhsam, who has had two major cancer surgeries in the past
seven years and has numerous chronic medical problems.
Additionally, Mr. RuhsairTs demonstrated earning capability is far
in excess of that of Mrs. Ruhsam.

The award of $600 per month

for alimony is so insubstantial as to constitute an abuse of
discretion, particularly in view of the fact that it is based
upon factual determinations unsupported by any evidence.
Additionally, the trial court's decision that both of
the parties1 residences be sold and that the occupancy and right
to sell the principal residence vacillate back and forth between
the parties on a six-month cycle is extremely prejudicial to
Mrs. Ruhsam and constitutes an abuse of discretion.

Not only is

Mrs. Ruhsam unable to qualify for mortgage funds to purchase
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replacement housing, she must move in and out of the house every
six months until it can be sold.

As a practical matter, she is,

therefore, also deprived of any practical use of the house until
it is sold.
Similarly, the trial court's arbitrary order that the
parties sequentially select items from a list of all their items
of personal propertv is ill-founded and constitutes an abuse of
discretion.

The role of the trial court is to maximize the

economic resources of the parties but this arbitrary approach
accomplishes nothing other than a physical separation of the
assets.

It results in a random distribution of the parties1

assets rather than a logical distribution from which the parties
may enjoy the greatest possible benefit.
Defendant-Appellant Janet Elizabeth Ruhsam respectfully
requests that this Court augment the alimony awarded to her and
reverse the property distribution entered by the trial court.

In

the alternative, Mrs. Ruhsam requests that this Court remand this
case to the trial court for the entry of an appropriate and
augmented alimony award and with instructions to hear evidence
and give consideration to the needs and circumstances of the
parties and fashion a property distribution that will permit
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Mrs. Ruhsam a place in which to live and maximize the economic
resources of the parties.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this jv

day of August, 1985,

DART, ADAMSON & PA^K^I

B. L. Dart

By

%^V>
Jbhn D ^ a r k t e n M ^
\
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify, as counsel for Appellant, that four
(4) true and correct copies of the foregoing Appellant's Brief
were served upon counsel for Respondent by mailing on the _f_-^
day of August, 1985, addressed as follows:
Pete N. Vlahos, Esq.
VLAHOS & SHARP
2447 Kiesel Avenue
Ogden, Utah 84401

Counselfor ftnnellant
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTA
,

L

^

_

_.

HUGH P. VON ZELL RUHSAMf SR.,
Plaintiff,

MEMORANDUM DECISION

vs.
Case No.

JANET ELIZABETH RUHSAM,

8 867 0
88756

Defendant,

The

two

files

(88670

and

88756) have

together for the purpose of this trial.
husband1s

prayer

for a divorce?

prayer for divorce*

been

combined

The older one is the

the newer one is the wife's

By stipulation, the parties have agreed that

the two files would be combined into this one trial*

The Court

considers that they are combined into the older file*
The parties stipulated

that each of them would limit

their evidence to a minimum showing of grounds for divorce.

It

may be that the reason for this stipulation was to limit further
hard feelings and animosities.
stipulation during the trial.

The parties have followed this
It is clear at the time of trial

that each of the parties does intend to abandon this marriage
relationship.

It is also clear that neither perty is willing to

make the concessions necessary for any possible reconciliation at
this time.

The Court, on the state of the evidence before it,

must conclude that the divorce is the result of equal fault on
both sides, and that the fault does not justify for any reason a
change in property awards or alimony than would have been proper
in a general case of parties in their situation divorcing one
another because of equal fault.
A-2
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FACTS
1.

Each of the parties have grounds for divorce and

each is awarded a divorce to become final of the expiration of
the statutory waiting period.
cruelty.

The grounds for divorce is mental

The cruelty is the abandonment of the marriage.
2.

children.

Mr. Ruhsam had been married before and had three
Mrs. Ruhsam had been married, but had no children.

The parties met and married while Mr. Ruhsam continued to pay his
child support.

This was fully anticipated by both parties at the

time of the marriage.
used

to

pay

his

The fact that some of the resources were

child

support

should

neither

increase

nor

decrease the property awarded at this time to either party.
3*
years.

The parties have been married for approximately 14

Most of the property accumulated or that now exists is

the result of the earnings of the husband.

This fact should

neither increase nor decrease the award to either party.

At the

time of the marriage it was anticipated that she would follow him
at the various air force bases and be an air force wife.
plan would

normally

interfere

with

her

earning

power.

Such
The

parties merge together their resources/ and the Court views the
conduct of the parties to be that which would be deemed to have
created
forward.

what

is

Neither

tantamount

to

a

party preserved

partnership
the

rights

from

that

in any

day

of the

properties which they held before their marriage as against the
otherf and each earning an equal share of anything accumulated.

A-3
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This was their continued arrangement until unhappiness ensued and
until after the husband left the air force.

Since his leaving of

the armed forces, his earnings have continued to be the principal
source of the accumulation of properties, but she has also made
an effort that was in accordance with her ability at that time.
The Court

deems

the

parties are entitled

situation

to be one

to approximately

properties accumulated.

in which

an equal

each

of the

division

of the

The husband has earned a pension as a

result of his service in the armed forces.

The portion of the

pension that he earned before this marriage should be regarded as
his and

his alone.

There

is some

evidence

that

a period

of

courtship existed before the marriage took place but there is no
evidence as to whether he was or was not married at that time,
nor is there any evidence of a partnership arrangement
in the property.
regarded

involved

This persuades the Court that it should not be

a partnership

before the time of the actual marriage.

His pension to the degree it was earned after the marriage should
be viewed as joint property, with each party entitled to an equal
share, in accordance with principles enunciated in previous Utah
decisions.

She is awarded her share on that basis and he should

be

to

ordered

sign

the

necessary

papers

cause that sum to be paid to her directly.

and/or

allotments

to

The physical health

and earning capacity of each of the parties is important

in the

Court1s determination on the issue of the award of alimony.

His

health is somewhat precarious, in that he is clearly the older of
A-4
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the two.

His health is also precarious in the sense that he has

a

condition

heart

and

other

health

problems.

His

earning

capacity at this time is somewhere between $2,000 and $3,000 per
month.

Her earning capacity would normally be enhanced by the

fact that she is younger, in fact the findings of fact should
recite the age of each.

However, her health in the last four

years has made her less employable.

She has had cancer in one

breast, which necessitated surgery, and a few years later in the
other breast, which again resulted in surgery.
and teeth problems.

She has also jaw

All of these events have produced a degree

of stress that has, up to the date of trial, limited her earning
capacity
earning

to about
capacity

$200 per month.
v/ould

return

to

The degree to which her
that

which

she

previously

enjoyed as an educated woman is speculative at this time.
alimony

award here made

is made

earnings will be between

on

the hypothesis

The

that his

$2,000 to $3,000 per month and her

earnings will be in the neighborhood of $200 per month both for
the foreseeable future.

Any gross material change in the earning

capacity of these parties might well result in a change in the
alimony

award

here made.

The

Court fixes the alimony here

awarded at $600 per month, that should be taxable

to her as

income and should continue until further order of the Court.
4.

The Court has considered at length how the division

of properties might be made.

The Court deems the suggested divi-

sion of each side to be plagued by self-interest.

The Court

A-5
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encourages the parties to attempt to negotiate the details of the
division during the next 3u Jays.

If they hc.ve not arrived at a

detail split in accordance with the general principle that everything is to be divided equally, the Court will attempt to make
such

an outline.

This

division

is predicated

on

the

Court's

conclusion as indicated below:
(a)
describes

The husband's testimony

the division

is correct

insofar

as it

of property which was made to make the

holdings safe from his former wife.

The division which he has

testified to as having occurred up to this time as an equal split
of the properties then considered is accepted by the Court.
(b)

The division of the real property should be made in

an equal basis on the principle
realized after sale.

of

that which

can

be

finally

The Court orders both properties sold, she

may control the sale of the home she now lives in for the next
six

months,

if

she

has

not

completed

the

sale

by

thenf

the

husband may have occupancy and a right to effect the sale for the
next six months.
real estate.

The husband may control the sale of the other

The total resulting from

all of the Leal

estate

shall be credited equally to each party.
(c)

All cash reserves as they existed on the day of the

trial are to be divided equally.
(d)

The division of the automobiles presents a particu-

lar difficulty.
as follows:

The Court concludes that the division is to be

he is to declare the value that he puts upon the
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the

parties

orrfci: them

cannot

do

to appear

tions will be

this without
at

the

supervision

court

at a time

the

Court

set and the

will

selec-

monitored by either the Court or one of the court

personnel designated to monitor the choosing*
(f)
resources
must

It appears to the Court

from which

compensate

they

their

the time of their
of the parties.

own

could

pay

party

their attorney.

attorney.

separation

that each

The

debts

will
Each

that

have
party

existed

shall be paid from the joint

at

assets

Each party will pay those debts which they have

accumulated since the filing of the divorce.
(g)
the

cash

husband

The

Court

reserves
the

membership

sum
in

are
of

the

orders

made,

$6 f 500
Ogden

that

there
which

Golf

before

shall
is

and

to

the

distribution

be

charged

be

represented

County

Club,

against

which

of
the

as

the

he

is

awarded.
DATED this

/ C>day of January, 1985.
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PETE N. VLAHOS
VLAHOS & SHARP
Attorney for Plaintiff
Legal Forum Building
2447 Kiesel Avenue
Ogden, Utah 84401
Telephone: 621-2464

C

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

<n
HUGH P. VON ZELL RUHSAM, SR,
Plaintiff,

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAV?

vs
JANET ELIZABETH RUHSAM,

CONSOLIDATED CIVIL NOS.
88670 & 88756

Defendant.
This matter having come on regularly for trial on the
3rd day of January, 1985, before the Honorable John F.
Wahlquist, one of the Judges of the above-entitled Court,
sitting without a jury, and the Plaintiff

appearing in

person and with his attorney, Pete N. Vlahos, and the
Defendant appearing in person and with her attorney, Jane A.
Marquardt, and it having been shown that each of the parties
had filed a Complaint in the above-entitled matter, and the
Defendant's Complaint having served as an Answer and Counterclaim, and the parties having stipulated that the two
cases be consolidated

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

and • that the parties would
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of
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and

herein
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, '

wife.
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COKCLUL^OMS
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OF

LAW

2

^nawk

Lane in Ogden, Weber County, Utah; a rental home located at
2079 West 3900 South in Roy, Utah, said home presently up
for sale; household furniture and furnishing, appliances, a
1981 Oldsmobile Cutlass automobile, which Defendant estimates has a value of $5,987.50, and a 1976 Datsun truck and
shell, valued at $1,725.00; membership at the Ogden Golf and
Country Club, valued at $6,500.00, exclusive of transfer
fee; a home located at 1865 East 5775 South in South Ogden,
Utah, which has been sold and that the parties have previously divided gold coins, silver coins, silver bullion, old
bullion, E.F. Hutton cash reserve and that each of the
0

parties have these items in their possession.

>ziur

% 523
-J^fij

6.

That

during

the

course

of

the

marriage, the

>DQJ5

parties herein have incurred a debt due and owing on the

P!J*Q

family home located at 1686 Mohawk Lane in Ogden, Utah; the

-1

mortgage due and owing on the home located at 2079 West 2900
South in Roy, Weber County, Utah, and that the parties have
each incurred debts and obligations since the separation.
7.

That the Plaintiff

is retired

from the United

States Air Force, having retired on April 30, 1979 , with 26
years, 11 months, or a total of 323 months, and that the
parties were married 8 years, 4% months, or 100 months
during

the time the Plaintiff was

in the military, or

approximately 31.1% while Plaintiff was in the military.
8.

That the Plaintiff had been married before, and

had three children.

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

That the Defendant had been married,
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nor
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or
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t ha t

i |
was

in accordance with her ability at that time.

The Court

deems the situation to be one in which each of the parties
are entitled

to apprrv*lately

properties accumulated.

an equal division of the

The Plaintiff has earned a pension

as a result of his service in the armed forces.

That

portion of the pension that Plaintiff earned before this
marriage should be regarded as his and his alone, said
portion being 68.9%, and 31.1% of the retirement accumulated
in the marriage.

There is seme evidence that a period of

courtship existed before the marriage took place but there
is no evidence as to whether he was or was not married at
the time, nor is there any evidence of a partnership arrangement involved in the property.

The Court is persuaded

that it should not be regarded as a partnership for the time
of the actual marriage.

Plaintiff's pension to the degree

was earned after the marriage should be viewed as joint
property, with each party entitled to any equal share, said
portion being 31.1% and should be shared in accordance with
the principles enunciated in the Utah decisions specifically
Woodward v. Woodward.

Defendant is awarded her share on

that basis, and Plaintiff should be ordered to sign the
necessary papers and/or allotments to cause that sum to be
paid to her directly.
10.

The physical health and earning capacity of each

of the parties is important in the Court's determination on
the

issue

of

alimony.

Plaintiff's

health

is

somewhat
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That from the above and foregoing Findings of

Fact, the Court arrives at the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

That the Plaintiff, HUGH P. RUHSAM, is entitled to

a Decree of Divorce from the Defendant, JANET ELIZABETH
RUHSAM,

and

the

Defendant,

JANET

ELIZABETH

RUHSAM,

is

entitled to a Decree of Divorce from the Plaintiff, HUGH P.
RUHSAM, same to become final 3 months from the signing and
entry with the Court.
2.

THat the Defendant is awarded 15.5% of the Plain-

tiff's Military retirement as her sole and separate property, and the Plaintiff is to sign whatever papers are necessary so that the allotment may be paid directly to the
Defendant.
3.

That if the taxes are taken out of Plaintiff's

retirement, then Defendant will receive 15.5% net, and if
Defendant receives 15.5% of the gross, she will be responsible for her own taxes.
4.

That the Defendant is granted the sum of $600.00

per month as and for alimony, said alimony shall continue
until the further order of the Court and shall be taxable to
the Defendant as income, said alimony being based on the
Plaintiff's earnings of between $2,000.00 and $3,000.00 per
month, and the Defendant's earnings being $200.00 per month,
and any gross material change in the earning capacity of
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11.

That the Plaintiff is shall be awarded the 1976

Datsun truck and shell, valued at $1,725.00, and the Defendant is hereby awarded the 1981 Oldsmobile which the Defendant values at $5,987.00, and that each of the parties shall
be charged with the values of these sums, unless either
feels the figure is unfair, and that each must declare
within 10 days what is its value, which both have done, and
that the Plaintiff may keep his car as his share of the
assets, and Defendant keep her car as her share of the
assets towards the total distribution of the assets on a
fifty-fifty basis.
12.

The Court grants to each of the parties, their

individual wearing apparel, jewelry, makeup, and sporting
goods equipment, with thf Defendant to be awarded the pets.
13.

That the Court then directs that the lists of

personal property submitted to the Court by Mrs. Ruhsam, the
Defendant, shall be used as the basis, dividing said property as follows:

That the Defendant may choose one item,

regardless of what that is, that is on this list which
includes both what she things should be awarded to her, that
which she believes should be awarded to the Plaintiff, and
that item will be awarded to her.

The Plaintiff will then

have a right to chose one item from said list, which shall
be his.
property

This procedure shall be followed until the list of
is exhausted.

If

the parties

cannot

do

this

without supervision, the Court will order them to appear at
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this

/

day of March, 19 85,

I mailed a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW by placing same

m

the United States Mail postage prepaid and addressed :

Jane A. Marquardt
Attorney for Defendant
2661 Washington Blvd.
Ogden, Utah 84401
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PETE N. VLAHOS
VLAKOS & SHARP
Attorney for PlaintilT
Legal Forum Building
2447 Kiesel Avenue
Ogdenf Utah 84401
Telephone: 621-2464

IN THF DISTRICT COORI nh WEBER COUNTY
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JANET ELIZABETH ROHSnH
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in order

to

eliminate hard feelings and animosities, and each of the
parties

having

been

sworn

and

testifying

in

their

own

behalf, exhibits having been offered a*.1 received, and tlxe
Court having taken said matter under advisement and having
rendered its memorandum decision in writing, and the Court
being fully cognizant of all matters pertaining therein, and
having made its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law,
separately stated in writing.
NOW, THEREFORE,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED, that the
Plaintiff, HUGH P. RUHSAM, is hereby granted a Decree of
Divorce from the Defendant, JANET ELIZABETH RUHSAM, and the
Defendant, JANET

ELIZABETH

RUHSAM,

is hereby

granted

a

Decree of Divorce from the Plaintiff, HUGH P. RUHSAM, same
to become final 3 months from the signing and entry with the
Court.
IT IS HEREBY FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGFD as follows:

1.

THat the Defendant is hereby awarded 15,5% of the

Plaintiff's Military retirement as her sole and separate
property, and the Plaintiff is to sign whatever papers are
necessary so that the allotment may be paid directly to the
Defendant.
2.

That if the taxes are taken out of Plaintiff fs

retirement, then Defendant will receive 15.5% net, and if

DECREE OF DIVORCE
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the

Plain-

tiff shall have occupancy of the home for 6 months and the
right to effect the sale for the next 6 months*
o.

That the Plaintiff shall have control of the sale

of the other real estate and the proceeds from the sale of
both homes shall be divided equally.
9.

That all cash reserves as they existed as of the

date ol trial, shall be divided equally between the parties.
10.

That the Plaintiff is hereby awarded

the 19 76

Datsun truck and shell, valued at $1,725.00, and the Defendant is hereby awarded the 1981 Oldsmobile which the Defendant values at $5,987.00, and that each of the parties shall
be charged with the values of these sums, unless either
feels the figure is unfair, and that each must declare
within 10 days what is its value, which both have done, and
that the Plaintiff may keep his car as his share of the
assets, and Defendant keep her car as her share of the
assets towards the total distribution of the assets on a
fifty-fifty basis.
11.
their

The Court hereby grants to each of the parties,

individual

wearing

apparel,

jewelry,

makeup, and

sporting goods equipment, with the Defendant to be awarded
the pets.
12.

That the Court hereby directs that the lists of

personal property submitted to the Court by Mrs. Ruhsam, the
Defendant,

shall

be

used

as

the

basis, dividing
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iuliowi,:

That
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Doiendar t

bhall

choose

one

item, regardless of what that is, that is on this list which
includes both what she things should be awarded to her, that
which she believes should be awarded to the Plaintiff, and
that item will be awarded to her.

The Plaintiff shall then

have a right to chose one item from said list, which shall
be his.

This procedure shall be followed until the list of

property

is exhausted.

If

the parties

cannot

do this

without supervision, the Court will order them to appear at
the Court at a time set, and the selections will be monitored by either the Court, or one of the Court personnel
designated

to monitor the choosing.

That the Plaintiff

shall hereby be awarded the Ogden Golf and Country Club
membership, valued at $6,500.00, and shall be charged that
sum prior to the distribution of the cash reserves, so that
each will share equally.
13.

That those debts that existed at the time the

parties separated, shall be paid from the joint assets of
the parties, but that each of the parties shall pat those
debts that they have accumulated since the filing of the
divorce.
14.

That each of the parties are ordered to assune and

pay their own attorney fees and costs.
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postage prepaid and addressed :
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Jane A. Marquardt
Attorney for Defendant
2661 Washington Blvd.
Ogden, Utah 84401
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
HUGH P. VON ZELL RUHSAM, SR.,
Plaintiff,

AMENDED
FINDINGS OF FACT,
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

v,
o

JANET ELIZABETH RUHSAM,

Consolidated Civil Nos,
88670 & 88756

Defendant.
U g CO 3

This matter having come on regularly for trial on the

I -} r- Q

c|i8

3rd day of January, 1985, before the Honorable John F.
Wahlquist, one of the Judges of the above-entitled Court,
sitting without a jury, and the Plaintiff appearing in
person

and with his attorney, Pete N. Vlahos, and the

Defendant appearing in person and with her attorney, Jane A.
Marquardt, and it having been shown that each of the parties
had filed a Complaint in the above-entitled matter, and the
Defendant's Complaint having served as an Answer and Counterclaim, and the parties having stipulated that the two
cases be consolidated

and that the parties would limit

evidence to grounds to a divorce to a minimum in order to
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14.

eliminate
parties

hard
having

feelings
been

and

sworn

animosities, and
and

testifying

each of
in

their

the
own

behalf, exhibits having been offered and received, and the
Court having taken said matter under advisement and having
rendered its memorandum decision in writing, and the Court
being fully cognizant of all matters pertaining therein, and
the

Court

having

previously

entered

Findings

of

Fact,

Conclusions of Law and a Decree of Divorce, now enters the
following

Amended

Findings

and

Conclusions

in

order

to

reflect the court's orders of May 13, 1985:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

That the Plaintiff has been an actual and bona

fide resident of Weber County, State of Utah for at least
three (3) months prior to the commencement of this action.
2.

That Plaintiff

and Defendant were married in

Colorado Springs, Colorado, on or
December,

1970, and

ever

since

about

said

the 18th day of

time, have

been and

still are husband and wife.
3.

That there are no children born as issue of

this marriage and none are expected*
4.

That

the Defendant has treated the Plaintiff

cruelly, and that the Plaintiff has treated the Defendant
cruelly, in that both parties have argued, are unable to get
along and that each has given up on saving the marriage,
rendering

further

marital

relations

between

the

parties

herein intolerable.
5.

That during

the course of the marriage, the

parties herein have acquired a home, located at 1686 Mohawk

2
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Lane in Ogden, Weber County, Utah; a rental home located at
2079 West 3900 South in Roy, Utah, said home presently up
for sale; household furniture and furnishings, appliances, a
1981 Oldsmobile Cutlass

automobile, which Plaintiff

esti-

mates has a fair market value of $6,350.00 and Defendant
estimates has a value of $5,987.00, and a 1976 Datsun truck
with

shell, valued

at $1,725.00; membership

Golf and Country Club, valued
transfer

fee; a home located

at the Ogden

at 56,500.00, exclusive of
at 1865 East

5775 South

in

South Ogden, Utah, which has been sold and that the parties
have

previously

divided

gold

coins, silver

coins, silver

bullion, old bullion, E.F. Hutton cash reserve and that each
of the parties have these items in their possession.
6.

That

during

the course of the marriage, the

4

parties herein have incurred

a debt due and owing on the

family home located at 1686 Mohawk Lane in Ogden, Utah; the
mortgage due and owing on the home located at 2079 West 3900
South in Roy, Weber County, Utah, and that the parties have
each incurred debts and obligations since the separation.
7.

That the Plaintiff is retired from the United

States Air Force, having retired in April 30, 1979, with 26
years, 11 months, or a total of 323 months, and that the
parties were married 8 years, 4V£ months, or 100 months during the time the Plaintiff was in the military, or approximately 31.1% while Plaintiff was in the military.
8.

That the Plaintiff had been married before, and

had three children.
FINDINGS OF FACT
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

That the Defendant had been married
A-29
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but had no children.

The parties met and married while the

Plaintiff continued to pay his child support.

This was

fully anticipated by both parties at the time of the marriage.
child

The fact that some of resources were used to pay his
support, should neither increase nor decrease the

property awarded by the Court.
9.

That the parties have been married for approxi-

mately 14 years.

Most of the property accumulated or that

which now exists is a result of the earnings of the husband.
This fact should neither increase nor decrease the award to
either party.

At the time of the marriagef it was antic-

ipated that the Defendant would follow the Plaintiff at the
various air force bases, and be an air force wife.

Such

plan would normally interfere with the Defendant's earning
power.

The parties merged together their resources, and the

Court views that the conduct of the parties to be that which
would be deemed to have created what is tantamount to a
partnership from that day forward.

Neither party preserved

the rights of any of the properties which they held before
this marriage as against the other, and each earning an
equal share of anything accumulated.

This was the parties

continued arrangement until unhappiness ensued and until
after the Plaintiff left the air force.

Since the Plain-

tiff's leaving of the air force, his earnings have continued
to be the principal source of the accumulation of properties, but the Defendant has also made an effort that was
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in accordance with her ability at that time.

The Court

deems the situation to be one in which each of the parties
are entitled

to approximately

properties accumulated.

an equal division of the

The Plaintiff has earned a pension

as a result of his service in the armed forces.

That

portion of the pension that Plaintiff earned before this
marriage should be regarded as his and his alone, said
portion being $68.9%, and 31.1% of the retirement accumulated in the marriage.

There is some evidence that a period of

courtship existed before the marriage took place but there
is no evidence as to whether he was or was not married at
the time, nor is there any evidence of a partnership arrangement involved in the property.

The Court is persuaded

that it should not be regarded as a partnership before the
time of the actual marriage.

Plaintiff's pension to the

degree it was earned after the marriage should be viewed as
joint property, with each party entitled to any equal share,
said portion being 31.1% and should be shared in accordance
with

the

principles

enunciated

specifically Woodward v. Woodward.

in

the

Utah

decisions

Defendant is awarded her

share on that basis, and Plaintiff should be ordered to sign
the necessary papers and/or allotments to cause that sum to
be paid to her directly.
10.

The physical health and earning capacity of each

of the parties is important in the Court's determination on
the

issue

of

alimony.

Plaintiff's

health

is

somewhat
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precarious, in that he is clearly the older of the two, his
health is also precarious in the sense that he has a heart
condition

and

other

health

problems.

The

Plaintiff's

earning capacity at this time is somewhere between $2,000,00
and $3,000,00 per month.

That Defendant's earning capacity

would normally be enhanced by the fact that she is younger,
that Plaintiff was born on January 1, 1929, and that the
Defendant was born zn August 21, 1935, making the Plaintiff
56 years of age, and the Defendant 49 years of age.
11.

That Defendant's health in the last four years has

made the Defendant less employable in that she has had
cancer in one breast, which necessitated surgery, and a few
years later, in the other breast, which again resulted in
surgery.

Defendant has also jaw and teeth problems. All of

these events have produced a degree of stress that has, up
to the date of trial, limited her earning capacity to about
$200.00 per month.
12.

i.'he degree to which her earning capacity would

return to that which she previously enjoyed as an educated
women, is speculative at this time. .The alimony awared here
being

made

is made

on

the

hypothesis

that

Plaintiff's

earnings would be between $2,000.00 and $3,000.00 per month,
and her earnings would be in the neighborhood of $200.00 per
month, both for the foreseeable future.

The Court finds

that any gross material change in earning capacity of these
parties might well result in the change in the alimony award
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here made.

That from the above and foregoing Findings of

Fact/ the Court arrives at the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

That the Plaintiff, HUGH P. RUHSAM is entitled to

a Decree of Divorce from the Defendant, JANET ELIZABETH
RUHSAM, and that the Defendant, JANET ELIZABETH RUHSAM is
entitled to a Decree of Divorce from the Plaintiff, HUGH P.
RUHSAM, said divorce to become final three months from the
signing and entry.
2.

That the Defendant is awarded 15.55% of the Plain-

tiff's Military retirement as her sole and separate property, and the Plaintiff is to sign whatever papers are necessary so that the allotment may be paid directly to the
Defendant.
3.

That if the taxes are taken out of Plaintifffs

retirement, then Defendant will receive 15.55% net, and if
Defendant

receives

15.55%

of

the

gross,

she

will

be

responsible for ner own taxes.
4.

That the Defendant is granted the sum of $600.00

per month as and for alimony, said alimony shall continue
until the further order of the Court and shall be taxable to
the Defendant as income, said alimony being based on the
Plaintiff's earnings of between $2,000.00 and $3,000.00 per
month, and the Defendant's earnings being $200.00 per month,
and any gross material change in the earning capacity of

FINDINGS OF FACT,
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
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these two parties, may well result in a change in the alimony award made.
5.

That the items of gold, silver and cash reserve

management accounts that have already been divided, shall be
accepted by the Court and considered as each having received
1/2 of those assets.
6*

That

the real property shall be made in the

equal basis or principal of that which can be finally realized after sale.
1.

The Court orders both the family homes located

at 1686 Mohawk Lane in Ogden, Weber County, Utah, and 2079
West

3900 South

in Roy, Weber County, Utah

be sold, and

after paying the mortgage and costs of sale, the proceeds
shall be divided equally.
8.

That the Defendant shall have control over the

sale of the home where she now lives, which is 1686 Mohawk
Lane in Ogden, Weber County, Utah for a period of 6 months,
and

if

the

sale

has

not

been

completed

by

then,

the

Plaintiff shall have occupancy of the home for 6 months and
the right to effect the sale for the next 6 months.
9.

That the Plaintiff shall have control of the

sale of the other real estate and the proceeds from the sale
of both homes shall be divided equally.
10.

That all cash reserves as they existed as of

the date of trial shall be divided equally between the parties
FINDINGS OF FACT
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
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Datsun

XX.

mat

truck

and

Defendant

shall

the" Plaintiff

shell,

shall be awarded the 1976

valued

be awarded

at

$1,725.00,

the 1981 Oldsmobile

and

the

which

the

Plaintiff values at $6,350.00, and the Defendant values as
$5,987.00, and

that each of the parties shall *"be charged

with the values of these sums, unless either feels the figure is unfair, and that each must declare within 10 days
what

is

its

value,

which

both

have

done,

and

that

the

Plaintiff may keep his car as his share of the assets, and
Defendant keep her car as her share of the assets towards
the total distribution of the assets on a fifty-fifty basis.
12.

The Court grants to each of the parties, their

individual wearing

apparel, jewelry, makeup, and

sporting

goods equipment, with the Defendant to be awarded the pets.
13.

That the Court then directs that the lists of

personal property submitted to the Court by Mrs. Ruhsam, the
Defendant, shall be used as the Dasis, dividing said property as follows:
regardless

of

what

That the Defendant may choose one item,
that

is, that

is on

this

list

which

includes both what she thinks should be awarded to her, that
which she believes should be awarded to the Plaintiff, and
that item will be awarded to her.

The Plaintiff will then

have a right to choose one item from said list, which shall
be his.

This procedure shall be followed until the list of

property is exhausted.

If the parties cannot do this with-

out supervision, the Court will order them to appear at the

FINDINGS OF FACT
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C o u r t at a time s e t , anci the s e l e c t i o n s w i l l be m o n i t o r e d

by

either the Court, or one of the Court personnel designated
to

monitor

the

choosing.

That

the

Plaintiff

shall

be

awarded the Ogder* o^"** and Country Cl'ib membership, valued
at

$6,500.00,

charged

that

exclusive
sum

prior

of
to

transfer
the

fee,

and

distribution

of

shall
the

be

cash

reserves, so that each will share equally.
14.

That those debts that existed at the time of

the parties separation, shall be paid from the joint assets
of the parties, but that each of the parties shall pay those
debts

that they have accumulated

since the filing of the

divorce.
15.

That each of the parties must assume and pay

their own attorney fees and costs.

DATED this

/ // day of

^ , s\

//1 f /L^CSl

, 1985

BY THE COU
/ .

/

N P. WAHLQUI93'
WAHLQUI93' W /
JOHN
nastrict Court Judge

^\^f

ApBPe^ed as to form:

Ms
JA'N&'A. MARQUAREtf!
At^ornjay-^or Defendant

Attorne

n

AHOS
or Plaintiff
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MAY
PETE N. VLAHOS
VLAHOS & SHARP
Attorney for Plaintiff
Legal Forum Building
2447 Kieb<il Avenue
Ogden, Utah 84401
Telephone: 621 2464

15 4 43 PM '85

WEPEP i V y i j Y CLERK
RICHARD R. GREENE

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

HUGH P. VON ZELL RUHSAM, SR.,
Plaintiff,

DECREE OF DIVORCE
AMENDED NUNC PRO TUNC

V.

JANET ELIZABETH RUHSAMf

Consolidated Civil Nos,
88670 & 88756

Defendant.
This matter having come on regularly for trial on the
3rd day of January, 1985, before the Honorable John F.
Wahlquist, one of the Judges of the above-entitled Court,
sitting without a jury, and the Plaintiff
person

appearing in

anu with his attorney, Pete N. Vlahos, and the

Defendant appearing in person and with her attorney, Jane A.
Marquardt, and it having been shown that each of the parties
had filed a Complaint in the above-entitled matter, and the
Defendant's Complaint having served as an Answer and Counterclaim, and the parties having stipulated that the two
cases be consolidated

and that the parties would

limit

evidence to grounds to a divorce to a minimum in order^%to
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eliminate

parties

Hard

having

feelings and animCSl Lies1, and each of

been

sworn

and

testifying

in

their

the

own

behalf, exhibits having been offered and received, and the
Court having taken said matter under advisement and having
rendered its memorandum decision in writing, and the Court
being fully cognizant of all matters pertaining therein, and
having made its Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law, separately stated in writing, now enters the following
Decree of Divorce, amended nunc pro tunc:
NOW, THEREFORE,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED, that
the Plaintiff, HUGH P. RUHSAM, is hereby granted a Decree of
Divorce from the Defendant, JANET ELIZABETH RUHSAM, and the
Defendant, JANET

ELIZABETH

RUHSAM,

is hereby

granted

a

Decree of Divorce from the Plaintiff, HUGH P. RUHSAM, same
to become final 3 months from the signing and entry with the
Court.
IT IS HEREBY FURTHER ORDERED as follows:
1.

That the Defendant is hereby awarded 15.55% of

the Plaintifffs Military retirement as her sole and separate
property, and the Plaintiff is to sign whatever papers are
necessary so that the allotment may be paid directly to the
Defendant.
2.

That if the taxes are taken out of Plaintiff's

retirement, then Defendant will receive 15.55% net, and if
Defendant receives 15.55% of the gross, she will be responsible for her own taxes.
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3.

That the Defendant is hereby granted the sum of

$600.00 per month as and for alimony, said alimony shall
continue until the further order of the Court and shall be
taxable to the Defendant as income, said" alimony being based
on

the

Plaintiff's

earnings

of

between

$2,000.00

and

$3,000.00 per month, and the Defendant's earnings being
$200.00 per monthf

and any gross material change in the

earning capacity of these two parties, may well result in a
change in the alimony award made.
4.

That the items of goldr silver and cash reserve

management accounts that have already been divided, shall be
accepted by the Court and considered as each having received
1/2 of those assets.
• 5.

That the real property shall be made in the equal

basis or principal of that which can be finally realized
after sale.
6.

That the Court hereby orders both the family homes

located at 1686 Mohawk Lane in Ogden, Weber County, Utah,
and 2079 West 3900 South in Roy, Weber County, Utah be sold,
and after paying the mortgage and costs of sale, the proceeds shall be divided equally.
7.

That the Defendant may have control over the sale

of the home where she now lives, which is 1686 Mohawk Lane
in Ogden, Weber County, Utah, for a period of 6 months, and
if the sale has not been completed by then, the Plaintiff
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to effect the sale for the next 6 months.
8.

That the Plaintiff shaxl have control of the

sale of the other real escau. ^nd t*he proceeds fj.om the sale
of both homes shall be divided equally.
9.

That all cash reserves as they existed as of

the date of trial, shall be divided equally between the parties.
10.
Datsun

That the Plaintiff is hereby awarded the 1976

truck

and

shell, valued

at

$1,725.00, and

the

Defendant is hereby awarded the 1981 Oldsmobile, which the
Plaintiff values at $6,350.00, and the Defendant values it
as $5,987.00, and that each of the parties shall be charged
with the values of these sums, unless either feels the figure is unfair, and that each must declare within 10 days
what

is its value, which both have done, and

that the

Plaintiff may keep his car as his share of the assets, and
Defendant keep her car as her share of the assets towards
the total distribution of the assets on a fifty-fifty basis.
11.
their

The Court hereby grants to each of the parties,

individual

wearing

apparel,

jewelry,

makeup,

and

sporting goods equipment, with the Defendant to be awarded
the pets.
12.

That the Court hereby directs that the lists of

personal property submitted to the Court by Mrs. Ruhsam, the
Defendant, shall be used as the basis, dividing said prop-
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erty as follows:
regardless

of

1

That the Defendant shall choose one itemr

what

that

is, that

is on

this

list

which

includes both what she thinks should be awarded to her, that
which she believes should be awarded to the Plaintiff, and
that item will be awarded to her.

The Plaintiff shall then

have a right to choose one item from said list, which shall
be his.

This procedure shall be followed until the list of

property is exhausted.

If the parties cannot do this with-

out supervision, the Court will order them to appear at the
Court at a time set, and the selections will be monitored by
either the Court, or one of the Court personnel designated
to monitor the choosing.

That the Plaintiff shall hereby be

awarded the Ogden Golf and Country Club membership, valued
at

$6,500.00,

charged

that

exclusive
sum

prior

of
to

transfer
the

fee,

distribution

and
of

shall
the

be

cash

reserves, so that each will share equally.
13.

That those debts that existed at the time of

the parties separation, shall be paid from the joint assets
of the parties, but that each of the parties shall pay those
debts that they have accumulated

since the filing of the

divorce.
14.

That each of the part es are ordered to assume

DECREE OF DIVORCE
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and pay their own attorney fees and costs
DATED this

day of

^K)HN-F. WAHLQBT
District Court Judg
Approved
ARD
j£k>

as to form:

Ul

JApE A. MARQUARDT
A b ' t o r n e y ^ o r Defendant

(^J|5£E^fl.'
Attorney/for Plaintiff
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